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COMMENTS
SELECTED ASPECTS OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN PENNSYLVANIA
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS UNDER PENNSYLVANIA
LAW: THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC POLICY
ON PRIVATE CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In an attempt to resolve marital difficulties, spouses often arrange
a separation and execute contracts defining the rights and duties of each
party during the separation. Separation agreements are generally well
received by the courts for they relieve the judiciary of the burden of
entering marital disputes. Several problems have arisen, however, in
regard to the binding nature of these unique agreements. The core of the
difficulty with regard to separation agreements is that they are subject
to interpretation from two often conflicting viewpoints. On one side,
stand basic principles of contract which provide an element of certainty
to the relations of the parties. On the other, stand the interests of the
state in preventing enforcement of individual contracts contrary to basic
domestic policy considerations. The purpose of this Comment is to
explore the approach taken by Pennsylvania courts to this problem.
An attempt will be made to establish the hypothesis that separation
agreements are sui generis in nature, and should not be subject to rigid
contractual interpretation in all instances.
II. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR VALIDITY
Postnuptial agreements may be classified into two general categories:
family settlements, through which a husband and wife agree as to
the ownership of property within their joint possession; and separation
agreements, where spouses enter into a binding contract with respect
to the wife's support. These postnuptial arrangements are distinguished
by the fact that the latter is made after the spouses have separated, or
where a separation is imminent, while in the former, the parties do not
necessarily contemplate separation. It is settled law today in Penn-
sylvania that separation agreements between husband and wife,' wherein
1. At common law, a married woman's contracts including those with her hus-
band, were void. Although unenforceable under the common law, separation agree-
ments will be enforced in equity. Rice v. Shank, 382 Pa. 396, 115 A.2d 210 (1955).
For an analysis of age as a limitation on a wife's right to contract, see Note, 15 U.
Pir. L. Ryv. 643 (1954).
(120)
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property is divided, separate maintenance is provided for the wife, and
the husband's estate is released, are valid and will be enforced if fair
in their terms and fairly obtained.2  The courts apparently take the
view that disputes between husband and wife are best settled by the parties
themselves, and for this reason prefer and commend private settlements.8
A. As Related to Divorce
While valid public policy considerations support upholding separation
agreements, the courts have been careful not to allow the use of such
agreements as an inducement for obtaining divorce. In Commonwealth
v. Miller,4 a wife filed an action for support against her husband. The
husband, in defense, claimed that a separation agreement previously
executed by the parties barred the action. Under the terms of the agree-
ment, the husband was to place funds in escrow for the support of
his wife. The agreement also required the wife, immediately after
signing the contract, to institute divorce proceedings, and provided
further that the balance remaining in the escrow account was to be
returned to the husband if the divorce was not granted. In striking
down the agreement as one conducive to the procurement of a divorce,
the court distinguished a line of earlier cases5 holding separation agree-
ments valid although divorce may have been contemplated by the parties.
In distinguishing the earlier cases the court noted two points. First, it
did not appear in any of the previous cases that the separation agreements
had as their purpose the acquisition of a divorce. Second, in all of the
cases grounds for divorce existed prior to the execution of an agreement.6
Apparently, the court felt that the absence of pre-existing grounds for
divorce in Miller raised a strong presumption that the agreement
between the parties was not intended primarily as a property settlement.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Smylie v. Smylie,7 decided three years after
Miller, a separation agreement, under which a wife was required to
secure a divorce under penalty of forfeiting her right to institute an
action for support, was held invalid as directly conducive to the procure-
ment of a divorce. However, the court qualified its decision to a large
extent by stating that separation agreements in which the granting of
a divorce is a condition precedent to performance by either party are
2. See Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v. Miller, 176 Pa. Super. 64, 106 A.2d 627(1954); Commonwealth ex rel. Schaffhauser v. Schaffhauser, 164 Pa. Super. 54, 63
A.2d 410 (1949); Commonwealth ex rel. Mosey v. Mosey, 147 Pa. Super. 466, 24
A.2d 59 (1942).
3. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 284 Pa. 414, 131 A. 236 (1925).
4. 176 Pa. Super. 64, 106 A.2d 627 (1954).
5. Schmoker v. Schmoker, 359 Pa. 272, 59 A.2d 55 (1948); Commonwealth
ex rel. Schaffhauser v. Schaffhauser, 164 Pa. Super. 54, 63 A.2d 410 (1949) ; Common-
wealth ex rel. Rossi v. Rossi, 161 Pa. Super. 86, 53 A.2d 887 (1947) ; Forbes v. Forbes,
159 Pa. Super. 243, 48 A.2d 153 (1946).
6. Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v. Miller, 176 Pa. Super. 64, 106 A.2d 627,
629 (1954).
7. 184 Pa. Super. 276, 132 A.2d 386 (1957).
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not per se illegal or contrary to public policy." Other cases have upheld
separation agreements in which payments to the wife were conditioned
on procurement of an absolute divorce, 9 and where the parties agreed
to limit the grounds upon which a future divorce would be sought.10
From a review of the cases, it appears that the distinction between
agreements which are directly conducive to divorce, and thus illegal,
and those which are made only in contemplation of divorce, and thus
legal, is by no means a clear one." At best, the rule provides a con-
venient tool through which the courts of Pennsylvania can hold invalid
those agreements not to their liking.
B. Physical Separation of the Parties
Other general requirements for the validity of separation agreements
under Pennsylvania law concern the separation of the parties them-
selves. It is well settled that the separation must have already occurred
or be imminent, and thus agreements to effectuate a future separation
are invalid. 12 Further, both parties to the contract must consent to the
separation. Silent acquiescence to a separation does not constitute con-
sent, 3 and it has been held that even a signed separation agreement is
not conclusive evidence that the separation of the parties was consensual. 4
If the parties affect a reconciliation, it is the general rule that the
separation agreement is abrogated, for living apart is the essential con-
sideration for the agreement.' 5 What conduct on the part of the parties
constitutes a sufficient reconciliation to display an intention to abandon
a separation agreement is a question of fact to be determined from all the
surrounding circumstances and may vary considerably.' Although co-
8. Id. at 279, 132 A.2d at 386.
9. Commonwealth ex rel. Dora v. Dora, 392 Pa. 433, 141 A.2d 587 (1958).
10. Forbes v. Forbes, 159 Pa. Super. 243, 48 A.2d 153 (1946). However, where
the sole reason for consummation of the agreement is the wife's threat to contest
impending divorce proceedings, the agreement is directly conducive to divorce and thus
void. Gershman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 405 Pa. 485, 176 A.2d 435 (1961).
11. Other jurisdictions also appear to have difficulty in drawing the line between
legal and illegal separation agreements where the divorce issue is involved. In Viles v.
Viles, 14 N.Y.2d 365, 200 N.E.2d 567, 251 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1964), the New York Court
of Appeals ruled that the trial court was correct in holding a separation agreement
invalid where evidence was presented as to a collateral oral understanding between
the parties and their attorneys that a divorce would follow. The Viles decision pre-
cipitated much comment as to whether attorneys, representing spouses in matrimonial
matters, could even talk about a subsequent divorce. See 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION
AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 31, at 8-10 (Supp. 1969). The scope
of the Viles ruling, however, was considerably narrowed by a subsequent amendment
to section 5-311 of the General Obligations Law providing that separation agreements
would not be declared invalid as inducive to divorce unless they contained an express
provision requiring the dissolution of the marriage. See also Rosen v. Goldberg,
28 App. Div. 2d 1051, 283 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1967).
12. See Kaiser's Estate, 14 Pa. Super. 155 (1900).
13. Sacks v. Sacks, 172 Pa. Super. 543, 94 A.2d 147 (1953).
14. Commonwealth ex rel. Pitucci v. Pitucci, 200 Pa. Super. 591, 189 A.2d 912(1963). As to effect of an offer to resume marital relations on the consent issue,
see Commonwealth ex rel. Doering v. Doering, 157 Pa. Super. 9, 41 A.2d 358 (1945).
15. See Commonwealth v. Doughty, 187 Pa. Super. 499, 144 A.2d 521 (1958);
Commonwealth ex rel. Makowski v. Makowski, 163 Pa. Super. 441, 62 A.2d 71 (1948).
16. Id.
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habitation by the parties subsequent to the execution of an agreement
of separation will generally be construed as intent to renunciate the
agreement,1 7 such activity under Pennsylvania law is by no means con-
clusive proof that a reconciliation sufficient to abrogate the agreement
has occurred.' 8 Finally, it is important to note that a reconciliation annuls
only executory provisions of a separation agreement;19 the executed
provisions are considered valid.
C. Absence of Fraud and Duress
Since separation agreements are grounded in contract, basic prin-
ciples of contract law, with few exceptions, dictate the majority of other
requirements for their validity.20 In the area of fraud and duress,
however, Pennsylvania courts have, in some instances, declined to apply
general principles of contract, opting instead for equitable considerations
as a basis for their decisions. This inconsistent approach by the courts
has led to confusion and contradiction in the case law. In Schoble v.
Schoble,21 a husband brought a bill in equity to revoke a separation
agreement averring that his wife, through her attorney, had persuaded
him to sign an unconscionable agreement. 22 The lower court declared
the agreement void holding:
The extreme unfairness of the agreement, the circumstances under
which it, and the confirmatory agreement were signed, the apparent
domination by the plaintiff and her advisors, amounts, in our opinion,
to constructive fraud and should be relieved against. 23
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding
that the husband had failed to prove the existence of fraud in the
execution of the agreement.2 4 The basis of the Supreme Court's decision
17. Commonwealth v. Doughty, 187 Pa. Super. 499, 144 A.2d 521 (1958).
18. See In re Ray's Estate, 304 Pa. 421, 156 A. 64 (1931), where the court held
that the determinative issue was not the subsequent cohabitation of the parties itself,
but rather whether the resumption of marital relations evidenced an intent to re-
nunciate the agreement.
19. Id. It should be noted that a reconciliation of the parties does not abrogate
a post-nuptial property settlement. Whether the agreement entered into by the parties
constitutes a post-nuptial settlement or merely a separation agreement depends upon
the intent of the parties as gathered from all the facts. See Commonwealth v. Doughty,
187 Pa. Super. 499, 144 A.2d 521 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Di Valerio v.
Di Valerio, 169 Pa. Super. 477, 82 A.2d 687 (1951); Commonwealth ex rel. Makowski
v. Makowski, 163 Pa. Super. 441, 62 A.2d 71 (1948).
20. The general rules pertaining to construction of terms of contracts also apply
to separation agreements. Thus, where the agreement is susceptible of conflicting
interpretations, the one that ascribes natural conduct to the parties will govern.
Wiegand v. Wiegand, 349 Pa. 517, 37 A.2d 492 (1944). Also, where one of two
possible interpretations imputes bad faith, and the other does not, the latter will prevail.
Wells v. Wells, 166 Pa. Super. 635, 74 A.2d 702 (1950). See also 2 A. LINDrY,
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRAcTs § 32 (1964).
21. 349 Pa. 408, 37 A.2d 604 (1944).
22. The evidence presented at trial, however, did not support the husband's claim.
It appeared that the wife's attorney was a personal friend of the husband and that
previously the attorney had informed the husband that he intended to obtain the best
possible arrangement for the wife. Id. at 410, 37 A.2d at 605.
23. Id. at 410, 37 A.2d at 605.
24. Schoble v. Schoble, 349 Pa. 408, 37 A.2d 604, 605 (1944).
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was made clear by its reliance on an earlier case, Berardini v. Kay,25
where it was held that a "written contractual obligation may not be
nullified because a party who signs it recklessly, and in complete disregard
of his own interests and the rights of others, refuses to take the
common precaution of reading what is plainly written on the instrument
before him."
The trend reflected in the Schoble decision of strict enforcement
of separation agreements has been repudiated to a large extent by later
decisions of Pennsylvania courts. In Commonwealth v. Doughty,26 a
husband appealed from an order requiring him to pay fixed amounts
for support of his wife and son on the basis that the parties had previously
entered into a separation agreement. The husband, in the presence of
his attorney, induced his wife to sign the agreement by informing her
that he had had an affair with another woman resulting in her preg-
nancy, and that the brothers of this woman were "gunning" for him.
The husband also falsely promised to remarry the wife, claiming that
his only purpose in marrying the other woman was to give the expected
child a name. In holding the agreement void for fraud, duress, and
coercion,27 and thus no defense to an action for support, the court
labelled the agreement an integral part of a plan to rid the husband
of his marriage obligation "more devious and complicated than has ever
come to our attention. 28
It is not easy to reconcile the Schoble and Doughty decisions. In
both cases, the terms of the agreement were unreasonable and the con-
ditions under which the agreement was signed were highly unfavorable
to the complaining party. Also, in both instances, the complaining party
had no legal representation at the time the agreement was executed.
One distinguishing factor is that in Schoble, the husband was seeking
to avoid the terms of the agreement while in Doughty the wife was the
complaining party. Whether, under Pennsylvania law, the quantum of
proof necessary to establish fraud sufficient to void a separation agree-
ment varies with which marital partner is the complaining party is not
clear. 29  The decision in Doughty would appear, however, to indicate
that Pennsylvania courts will no longer blindly hold parties, particularly
the wife, to a separation agreement without careful scrutiny of its terms,
and the circumstances under which it was executed. 0
25. 326 Pa. 481, 486, 192 A. 882, 884 (1934).
26. 187 Pa. Super. 499, 144 A.2d 521 (1958).
27. The fact that the parties had effected a reconciliation subsequent to the agree-
ment provirl'd an additional basis for voiding the agreement. Id.
28. Commonwealth v. Doughty, 187 Pa. Super. 499, 502, 144 A.2d 521, 523 (1958).
29. It is the policv in many jurisdictions to construe separation agreements infavor of the wife for she is usually in the weaker bargaining position. This perhapsjustifies differentiating on the basis of sex as to the presumption of validity. See 1 A.
LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTUNUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 3, at 18-23 (1964).
30. For other cases dealing with the problem of fraud and duress in separation
agreements, see Tracy v. Tracy, 377 Pa. 420, 105 A.2d 122 (1954); Brunner v.
Brunner, 104 Pa. Super. 539, 158 A. 615 (1932) ; Clayden v. Clayden, 9 Pa. D. & C.
681 (C.P. Phila. 1927).
[VOL. 15
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III. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS WITHIN SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
Assuming a separation agreement meets the general requirements
for validity, close judicial scrutiny of particular clauses within the agree-
ment will generally occur. The two clauses in separation agreements most
productive of controversy are the support clause and the custody clause."'
A. Wife's Support
Common law imposed upon the husband a duty to support his
wife and children in accordance with his financial condition and general
situation in life.3 2 Most jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, have codi-
fied this duty in support statutes. 3 Under Pennsylvania law, a husband's
duty to support his wife terminates upon divorce,8 4 the wife's misconduct 8
or death, and the husband's death86 unless there is an agreement to the
contrary. The execution of a valid separation agreement within which
fair and adequate provision is made for the wife's support will bar
any subsequent action for support by the wife as long as the husband
continues or completes his performance under the agreement.8 7 There
appears to be no set formula for determining what constitutes a fair
and adequate support allowance. Rather, it is a question of fact to
be determined from several factors including the wife's previous standard
of living, her present needs, and the husband's economic situation. 8s
31. See generally 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL
CONTRACTS § 14, at 1-6 (1964).
32. See Gessler v. Gessler, 181 Pa. Super. 357, 124 A.2d 502 (1956).
33. See, e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 48, § 131 (1965).
34. In Pennsylvania, absolute divorce completely terminates the marriage rela-
tion and all duties, including support, arising from it. See Commonwealth ex rel.
Bortin v. Bortin, 210 Pa. Super. 355, 234 A.2d 55 (1967) ; Lorusso v. Lorusso, 189
Pa. Super. 403, 150 A.2d 370 (1959) ; Harrison v. Harrison, 183 Pa. Super. 562, 133
A.2d 870 (1957).
35. Pennsylvania courts have taken the rather extreme view that the wife's
misconduct must be sufficient to constitute grounds for divorce to justify relieving the
husband of his duty to support. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 183 Pa. Super. 36,
128 A.2d 181 (1956); Commonwealth v. Williams, 178 Pa. Super. 313, 116 A.2d 297
(1955). A wife does not lose her right to support if she leaves for just cause, and
even where she leaves without just cause, her right to support continues if the
husband acquiesces in the separation. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 183 Pa. Super.
36, 128 A.2d 181 (1956). However, if the husband in good faith, withdraws his consent
and asks the wife to return, her refusal would terminate the support obligation. See
Commonwealth ex rel. Davidoff v. Davidoff, 178 Pa. Super. 549, 115 A.2d 892 (1955).
36. Even though the husband's obligation to furnish support terminates upon his
death, he may voluntarily undertake to bind his estate to continue the payments to
his wife after he dies. See Elmendorf v. Whitney, 153 Pa. 460, 25 A. 607 (1893).
Where the husband agrees to maintain his wife "as long as she lives," his estate will
be bound, though not explicitly so stated. See In re Pierce's Estate, 123 Pa. Super.
171, 187 A. 58 (1937). See also Wolfsohn v. Solms, 392 Pa. 129, 139 A.2d 523 (1958).
37. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Schaffhauser v. Schaffhauser, 164 Pa. Super.
54, 63 A.2d 410 (1949).
38. For an exhaustive analysis of the factors to be considered in determining
the amount of a support allowance under a separation agreement, see 1 A. LINDEY,
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 15, at 78-94 (1964).
COMMENTS
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The fact that the wife has a means of income of her own does not wholly
relieve the husband of his support obligation under Pennsylvania law.89
Surprisingly, it is the form that support payments take, rather
than their amount in particular cases, which has occasioned the most con-
troversy. Although a multitude of arrangements are possible,40 it is
convenient from an analytical viewpoint to classify the form of payment
as either periodic or lump-sum. Under the lump-sum 4' arrangement,
the wife agrees to accept a single sum, to be paid in one or more install-
ments, in exchange for her right to future support from her husband.
A valid lump-sum agreement constitutes a waiver on the part of the
wife of her right to support and bars any subsequent action at law by
the wife for support. The periodic payment arrangement is distinguished
by the fact that the husband's support duty is not reduced to a single
definite sum, but rather is considered as a continuing one. Under the
periodic arrangement, payments may be fixed or flexible and the wife
is not deemed to have waived all rights to future support. Thus, she
may institute an action for an increase in the support payments if a
change in circumstances warrants such an increase.
It is settled law in Pennsylvania that agreements for the release
of future support by the wife are valid and will be upheld if fair and
reasonable. 42 However, noting that such agreements are of great im-
portance, the courts have scrutinized them closely, requiring that they
be established by evidence which is "clear, positive, and convincing. 43
The use of the lump-sum arrangement has several advantages which
tend to support the Pennsylvania position as to their validity. First,
they reduce the necessity of personal contact between the parties inherent
39. See Commonwealth v. Litz, 190 Pa. Super. 310, 154 A.2d 420 (1959);
Commonwealth ex rel. Lagazu v. Lagazu, 180 Pa. Super. 342, 119 A.2d 605 (1956).
40. Lindey lists the following types of provisions for the wife's support commonly
found in separation agreements:(a) Periodic payments, fixed or flexible;(b) A trust or an escrow, with income to the wife;(c) An annunity;
(d) Payment of a gross amount in a single sum;
(e) Payment of a gross amount in installments;(f) Transfer of real or personal property, or both in final settlement of the
husband's obligation for support; or(g) A combination of any two or more of the above.I A. LIND4Y, SAPARATIoN AGREEMENTS AND ANUENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 15, at 102-04
(1964).
41. A lump sum settlement is sometimes mistakenly labeled "alimony in gross."
Alimony may be distinguished from support provisions of a separation agreement by
the fact that the former arises from a judicial decree while the latter is the result of
a contract between the parties. Id.
42. See Commonwealth ex rel. Jablonski v. Jablonski, 179 Pa. Super. 498, 118
A.2d 222 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Schaffhauser v. Schaffhauser, 164 Pa. Super.
54, 63 A.2d 410 (1949). The jurisdictions permitting lump sum settlements include
Connecticut, Ohio, and Maryland. See Liber v. Liber, 14 Conn. Supp. 64 (1946);
Meyer v. Meyer, 153 Ohio St. 408, 91 N.E.2d 892 (1950) ; Frank v. Frank, 207 Md.
124, 113 A.2d 411 (1955).
43. Commonwealth ex rel. Schafthauser v. Schaffhauser, 164 Pa. Super. 54, 63
A.2d 410, 412 (1949).
[VOL. 15
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in the periodic arrangement.4 4 Secondly, the payment of a definite sum
lends an element of certainty to the financial situations of both parties.4 5
Finally, since the wife has waived her right to support, the courts are
not burdened with continuing disputes over the amount and duration
of payments under the agreement.
A few jurisdictions have refused to recognize separation agreements
within which the wife has waived her right to support, declaring such pro-
visions void as contrary to public policy.4 6 In New York, lump-sum ar-
rangements have been construed as violative of a specific legislative
mandate. Section 5-311 of the General Obligations Law states in perti-
nent part:
A husband and wife can not contract to alter or dissolve the
marriage or to relieve the husband from his liability to support his
wife or to relieve the wife of liability to support her husband
provided that she is possessed of sufficient means and he is in-
capable of supporting himself and is or is likely to become a
public charge.47
Lump-sum arrangements have been interpreted in New York as an
attempt by the husband to purchase exemption from his support duty
and are thus considered in direct contravention of the statute.48 Two
major policy considerations form the basis of the New York view. First,
it is apparent that the legislature of New York favors strict judicial
control over the legal consequences of the marriage contract.4 9 Second,
from a practical viewpoint, it is clear that the legislature feared the
possibility that a wife might squander whatever settlement she received,
and thus become a public charge, her husband having been relieved of
his support duty by the agreement. This would appear to be a particularly
relevant consideration where children are involved.
Despite the obvious advantages of lump-sum agreements mentioned
previously, it is suggested that the New York position is the better
view. It is important to note that New York courts have taken the
view that lump-sum agreements are not per se illegal or void.50 Rather,
the courts consider them voidable. Thus where the husband and wife
enter into a separation agreement under which the wife accepts a lump-
44. See 1 A. LINDZY, SZPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTUNUPTIAL CONTRACTS§ 15, at 2-3 (1964).
45. Id.
46. See Laleman v. Crombez, 6 Ill. 2d 194, 127 N.E.2d 489 (1955), where the
court stated:
The rule of law which makes a wife's waiver of her right to support unen-
forceable is designed in part for her protection, and in part for the protection of
the public, upon whom the necessity of supporting her might fall if the husband
should fail to discharge his obligation.
Id. at 195-96, 127 N.E.2d at 491.
47. N.Y. GeN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-311 (McKinney 1964).
48. See Leeds v. Leeds, 308 N.Y. 991, 127 N.E.2d 845 (1955).
49. See Haus v. Haus, 298 N.Y. 69, 71, 80 N.E.2d 337, 339 (1948); Weiman
v. Weiman, 295 N.Y. 150, 154, 65 N.E.2d 754, 755-56 (1946).
50. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 140 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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sum settlement, the husband takes the risk that the agreement will
be set aside if unfair and if the proceeds of the settlement are
exhausted by the wife. 51 The risk that the husband may have to pay
twice provides an impetus toward making an adequate settlement during
the original negotiations. Further, by discouraging lump-sum settlements,
the courts effectively help to relieve highly inequitable situations which
result when, subsequent to the settlement, either party experiences a
noted increase or decrease in earning power. Finally, discouragement
of lump-sum settlements promotes the state's interest5 2 for a continuing
duty is placed upon the husband to support his wife, thereby preventing
her from becoming a public charge.
B. Child Support
It is well established that the primary obligation for child support
rests upon the father.5 3 The obligation to support children does not,
as in the case of the wife, terminate upon divorce.54  The proper
measure of support for a child is dependent on a number of factors
including the earning power of the father, his financial resources, 55 and
the needs and ambitions56 of the child. The fact that the mother, as
custodial parent, may have independent income is a factor to be considered,
but will not, in all cases, constitute a bar to compelling contribution from
the father. 57
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the courts of Pennsylvania
have been careful to guard the support rights of children. Thus, it is
well settled that a mother can not by means of a lump-sum settlement
bargain away the right of her minor child to adequate support from the
father, regardless of the validity of the agreement as to the parties
themselves. 5 8 Child support provisions within separation agreements,
51. Friedman v. Friedman, 114 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. 1952).52. The interests of states in seeing that husbands fulfill their support obligationshas led to legislation providing for interstate enforcement of support awards and
support obligations under separation agreements. See Comment, The Uniform Recipro-
cal Enforcement of Support Act: Procedural Problems and A Technological Solution,
41 TEMv. L.Q. 325 (1968). Pennsylvania courts have enforced this type of legislation.
See Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 175 Pa. Super. 100, 103 A,2d 430 (1954).
53. Commonwealth ex rel. Yeats v. Yeats, 168 Pa. Super. 550, 79 A.2d 793 (1951).
54. Id.
55. For an illuminating discussion of the factors to be considered in determining
what constitutes ade-uate supnort, see Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa. Super. 276, 150 A.2d
139 (1959).
56. As to whether a father, in the absence of an agreement, will be required to
finance a college education for children in the custody of his wife, see Commonwealth
ex rel. Larsen v. Larsen, 211 Pa. Super. 30, 234 A.2d 18 (1967) Commonwealth
ex rel. Brown v. Weidner, 208 Pa. Super. 114, 220 A.2d 382 (1966); Commonwealth
ex rel. Rothrock v. Rothrock, 205 Pa. Super. 32, 206 A.2d 397 (1965). For a con-
struction of the term "schooling" within a separation agreement, see Commonwealth
ex rel. Grossman v. Grossman, 188 Pa. Super. 236, 146 A.2d 315 (1958),
57. See generally Mullinger v. Mullinger, 197 Pa. Super. 34, 175 A.2d 890(1961); Commonwealth ex rel. Heller v. Yellin, 174 Pa. Super. 292, 101 A.2d
452 (1953).
58. Commonwealth v. Beavin, 168 Pa. Super. 73, 76 A.2d 653 (1950) ; Common-
wealth ex rel. Rey v. Rey, 159 Pa. Super. 284, 48 A.2d 131 (1946).
[VOL. 15
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when contested, have, at best, only evidentiary value, and the final decision
as to whether adequate provisions have been made rests in the courts.5 9
Where, in fact, the child support provisions within a separation agree-
ment are inadequate at law, Pennsylvania provides a statutory remedy for
support, available upon petition to the court, and complete with criminal
sanctions to be used if the father fails to provide such "reasonable"
support as the court may order. 60
In those cases where the child support provisions within a separation
agreement are more than adequate, the issue arises as to whether a child,
though not a party to the agreement, may enforce those terms of the
contract which inure to his benefit. There appear to be three views on
the question. Some courts hold that where the contract dictates that all
payments be made directly to the mother, the child receives only incidental
benefit, and thus, under the third party beneficiary theory,61 is not a
proper party to maintain an action for its enforcement.62 Under the
New York view, a child may not sue to enforce support provisions paid
directly to the mother unless the mother refuses or is incapable of
suing through disability.63 Finally, a few jurisdictions hold that the right
of a child to enforce separation agreements is unqualified.6 4 Although
there appears to be no direct Pennsyvania authority decisive of this issue,
one early case indicates that Pennsylvania courts will side with those
jurisdictions holding the right of a child to enforce a separation agree-
ment to be unqualified. In Brill v. Brill,65 an illegitimate child sought
to enforce an agreement between his mother and putative father providing
for monthly support payments to the mother. Subsequent to the agree-
ment, the mother released the father from his obligations under the
contract in return for a lump settlement. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the child, though not a party to the agreement,
had a sufficient beneficial interest to justify allowing the child to sue
for its enforcement. 6  Giving the child an unqualified right to enforce
separation agreements is the best reasoned view, for it is often the case
that provisions for support within a separation agreement are more
generous than those which could be obtained by pursuing statutory
59. Commonwealth v. Beavin, 168 Pa. Super. 73, 76 A.2d 653 (1950) ; Common-
wealth ex rel. Rey v. Rey, 159 Pa. Super. 284, 48 A.2d 131 (1946).
60. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4733 (1963).
61. For an analysis of contracts for the benefit of third parties, see generally
L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS §§ 116-23 (1965).
62. See, e.g., Percival v. Luce, 114 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1940).
63. See Forman v. Forman, 17 N.Y.2d 274, 217 N.E.2d 645, 270 N.Y.S.2d 586
(1966). For a detailed analysis of New York cases on this issue, see Comment,
Enforcement and Attack of Separation Agreements By the Wife and The Separable
Rights of Children as Third-Party Beneficiaries, 33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 290 (1966).
64. See Walsh v. Walsh, 28 Cal. App. 2d 723, 108 P.2d 760 (1940); Smith v.
Smith, 7 Ohio App. 2d 4, 218 N.E.2d 473 (1964). See also Note, Separation Agree-
ments To Make Mutual Wills for the Benefit of Third Parties, 18 HASTINGS L. Rsv.
423 (1967).
65. 282 Pa. 276, 127 A. 840 (1925).
66. Id. at 283, 127 A. at 843.
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remedies.67  Those jurisdictions which hold that the child is only an
incidental beneficiary under a support agreement between his parents
appear to be placing principles of contract on a higher scale than the
interests of the child.
C. Custody
As in the case of child support, agreements between parents relating
to custody of their children are not binding on the courts." Custody
of children is not a property right of the parents;89 in all instances, it
is the welfare of the child, not the interests of prior agreements of the
parents, which is the controlling consideration.7"
Under the typical separation agreement, custody of the children
is placed with the mother, and the duty of the father to provide support
under the contract is conditioned upon the granting of visitation rights
to the father. The question often arises whether a father can be held
liable for support for his children where the wife wrongfully denies
his visitation privileges. In the case where visitation rights arise out of
a support order, rather than from agreement of the parties, the law in
Pennsylvania is clear. In Commonwealth ex rel. Firestone v. Firestone,7 '
it was held that the fact that a divorced wife who was granted custody
of her minor child moved permanently to another state did not justify
relieving the father from liability for support of the child, notwith-
standing that the father was thereby deprived of his right to visitation.72
In explaining the underlying policy behind its ruling, the court stated:
But the duty of the father to support a three year old child is well
nigh absolute. Here the lower court relieved the father of this
duty to support because of some conduct of the mother not affecting
her fitness for custody. . . . Custody and support are two different
things. If this mother, by depriving the father of the right of visita-
tion were guilty of contempt of court (which we do not hold),
it could subject her, but never the child to penalties; and it does
not relieve the father of the duty to support the child under circum-
stances such as these.73
The value of the Firestone decision lies in its perception of the fact
that the controlling consideration is the welfare of the child, not the
rights of the parents.
67. Also, by suing on the contract, litigation of the proper measure of supportis avoided. See Comment, supra note 63, at 300.
68. See Commonwealth ex rel. Hubbell v. Hubbell, 176 Pa. Super. 186, 107 A.2d
388 (1954).
69. See Mullinger v. Mullinger, 197 Pa. Super. 34, 175 A.2d 890 (1961).70. See Commonwealth ex rel. Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 181 Pa. Super. 369, 124A.2d 462 (1956) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Hubbell v. Hubbell, 176 Pa. Super. 186,107 A.2d 388 (1954). See generally 1 A. LINDXY, SSPARATION AGRZMENTS AND
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 14, at 32-33 (1964).
71. 158 Pa. Super. 579, 45 A.2d 923 (1946).
72. Id. at 581-82, 45 A.2d at 924.
73. Id. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Crane v. Rosenberger, 212 Pa. Super.
144, 239 A.2d 810 (1968).
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In those cases where visitation rights arise from an agreement be-
tween the parties, rather than by judicial order, contract principles
emerge and are often controlling. It is the general rule that denial of
visitation rights reserved to the husband under a separation agreement
will suspend his obligation to make support payments until restoration
of his rights occur.74 Such a denial of visitation rights, however, re-
lieves the husband only of his contractual liability for support, and not
his support duty pursuant to statute.7 5 Thus, the wife may apply to
the court for a support award. Pennsylvania courts refuse to abide by
this general rule. In Malinger v. Malinger,76 the mother of a child
brought an action in assumpsit against the father to recover the amount
due her in accordance with the support provisions of a separation agree-
ment. The father admitted his failure to pay, but excused his failure
on the grounds that the mother had breached the contract by denying
him visitation privileges. In holding that the mother could recover, even
in light of her breach of the contract, 77 the majority relied heavily
on the policy enunciated in Firestone, stating that "the public policy
in the state of Pennsylvania requires the treatment of support of children
and visitation rights as distinct problems, both of which may be enforced
by proper and adequate legal action.17 8 The dissenting opinion aptly
pointed out that the majority's position was divergent from general
principles of contract law.
The mother's right to obtain a court order for support for her
child in this case seems clear and she can recover reasonable amounts
which she has expended for the child's support in quantum meruit.
But she is not entitled to recover on the contract which she herself
has broken.
79
Despite the validity of the dissent from a contractual viewpoint, several
important considerations buttress the majority position. First, as noted
previously, provisions in separation agreements for child support often
exceed the standards imposed by law. Further, the interruption of
payments by the father until a support order is obtained may work
severe hardship on the child, particularly where the mother has no
independent means of income. Finally, it is clear that the best interests of
the child are not served by allowing him to suffer the consequences of
his mother's action. These considerations clearly indicate that the Penn-
sylvania position as to the independence of the support and visitation
covenants is the better reasoned view.80
74. See 1 A. LINDXY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS§ 14, at 60 (1964).
75. See Garbarin v. Keller, 20 Misc. 2d 303, 189 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
76. 197 Pa. Super. 34, 175 A.2d 890 (1961).
77. Id. at 36, 175 A.2d at 891.
78. Id. at 38, 175 A.2d at 892.
79. Id. (dissenting opinion).
80. For the effect of a breach of a no molestation clause on the husband's duty
to support, see Wagner v. Wagner, 158 Pa. Super. 93, 43 A.2d 912 (1945). See also
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IV. CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES - JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
It is the general rule that separation agreements are not modifiable
when not incorporated s ' within a divorce decree.82 Thus, in the absence
of fraud, a husband will be held to the strict adherence of the support
provisions of a separation agreement despite the fact that he has suf-
fered financial reverses, or that children in the custody of the mother
have grown up and are self-supporting. 5  This rigid view on the part
of courts is supported by the fact that the parties had the opportunity
to insert within the original agreement a modification clause to cover
such unforeseen developments.8 4
An exception to the general rule that courts will not grant relief
from the terms of separation agreements on the basis of a change
in circumstances exists in regard to child support. In Hecht v. Hecht,8 5
the parties executed a separation agreement under which the father
agreed to make rather liberal support payments to the mother for the
benefit of the children in her custody. Subsequent to the agreement,
the father inherited large sums of money from several estates. The
mother, commenced an action to increase the support payments under
the agreement. In granting the increase, the court stated:
Children of wealthy parents are entitled to the educational ad-
vantages of travel, private lessons in music, drama, swimming,
horseback riding, and other activities in which they show interest
and ability. They are entitled to the best medical care, good clothes
and familiarity with good restaurants, good hotels, good shows, and
good camps.8
Note, Effect of Wife's Breach of Separation Agreement on Husband's Duty to
Support, 49 COLUM. L. Rv. 130 (1949).
81. Whether the incorporation of a separation agreement within a divorce decreeprovides a sufficient nexus for judicial modification has been a most troublesome issuein many jurisdictions. For an excellent review of the basic effect of incorporation on
separation agreements, see H. CLARK, LAW ov DOMESTic RtLATIONS 553-66 (1968).
There have been few decisions by Pennsylvania courts on this issue. As to
the effect of incorporation and merger on modifiability, see Silvestri v. Slatkowski,
423 Pa. 498, 224 A.2d 212 (1966). As to the enforceability of incorporated agreements
through contempt proceedings, see Buswell v. Buswell, 377 Pa. 487, 105 A.2d 608 (1954).
For a highly critical evaluation of New York law in this area, see Ploscowe
& Haber, Modifiability of Separation Agreements, Followed by Divorce, New York
Law Journal, March 6, 1968, at 1, col. 4.
82. H. CLARK, supra note 81, § 16.13, at 557.
83. See Adams v. Adams, 32 Pa. Super. 353 (1907) ; Biery v. Steckel, 194 Pa.
445, 45 A. 376 (1900). Other jurisdictions appear to follow the same rule. See Glazer
v. Silverman, 354 Mass. 177, 236 N.E.2d 199 (1968); Faller v. Faller, 247 Md. 631,
233 A.2d 807 (1967).
84. As to the advisability of placing an "escalator" clause within a separation
agreement in order to relieve hardship in regard to the support provisions, see
McNiece & Thorton, Separation Agreements and Changed Conditions, 25 ST. JosIN's
L. REv. 1 (1950).
85. 189 Pa. Super. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959).
86. Id. at 283, 150 A.2d at 143.
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It is thus clear that any arrangement between the parties as to child
support, even where the provisions are more than enough to cover
necessities, are at best temporary in nature, and may be changed by
judicial order whenever warranted by a change in circumstances. The
Hecht decision is indicative of the extent to which the courts attempt to
foster the welfare and interests of the child.
V. CONCLUSION
A review of Pennsylvania law on separation agreements indicates
that for the most part the courts have been unwilling to allow principles
of contract law to overshadow domestic policy considerations promotive
of the welfare of the family. The most important exception to this
general trend has been recognizing as valid a waiver of future support
by the wife. Considering the state's interest in seeing that the wife
does not have to rely on public funds for her support,8 7 a change is
indicated, and it is suggested that this be a matter of legislative concern.
Several proposals for reform of the law of separation agreements
have been made in other jurisdictions. In New York, it has been sug-
gested that all separation agreements containing provisions relating to
the welfare of children be submitted to the courts for approval.88 This
suggestion clearly has merit, particularly where the arrangements are
not in the child's interest, and neither parent comes forth to contest the
agreement. It has also been proposed that either spouse, after a desig-
nated period, should have the right to revoke a separation agreement
if a good faith attempt to save the marriage is demonstrated. 9 Adoption
of this proposal might lessen judicial concern on the use of separation
agreements as an inducement for divorce. It is submitted that both these
proposals are worthy of consideration by the Pennsylvania legislature.
David J. Griffith
87. The conclusion that a wife should not be allowed to waive her rights to
future support is further supported if one takes into consideration the circumstances
under which most agreements are executed. One commentator has stated that "[t]he
desire to settle a vexatious and emotionallv charged matrimonial situation too often
induces separation agreements to which counsel has devoted inadequate thought."
Fischer, Toward Better Separation Agreements, 4 J. FAM. L. 63 (1964). This com-
ment appears to apply equally as well to the parties to the agreement.
88. See STATE op Nxw YORK, REPORT O JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON
MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAWS, Legislative Doc. No. 44, at 69 (1959), cited in
H. CLARK, supra note 81, § 16.13, at 557-58 n.8.
89. See Payne, Proposals for Reform of the Law Relating to Separation and
Maintenance Aareements - Separation and Maintenance Agreements in England
and Canada, 33 SASK. L. Ryv. 1 (1968).
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